Operation Barbarossa (Unternehmen Barbarossa) was the German codename for Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet
Union during World War II, which commenced on 22. June 1941. It was to be the
turning point for the fortunes of Hitler's Third Reich in that the failure of Operation Barbarossa arguably resulted
in the eventual overall defeat of Nazi Germany. The Eastern Front which was opened by Operation Barbarossa would
become the biggest theatre of war in World War II, with some of the largest and most brutal battles, terrible
loss of life, and miserable conditions for Russians and Germans alike. The operation was named after the emperor
Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Roman Empire.
German preparations
Allegedly, the Germans feared the Red Army was making preparations to attack them, and it was thus presented as
a preemptive war. Hitler, however, made clear early on his belief
that the German people needed Lebensraum
("living space", i.e. land and raw materials), and that it was to be looked for in the East. It was the stated
policy of the Nazis to kill, deport, or enslave the Russian population, whom they considered inferior, and to
recolonise the land with German stock.
Before implementing Operation Barbarossa, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were nominally on friendly terms,
having signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact shortly before the German and Soviet invasion of Poland. It was ostensibly
a non-aggression pact in which the Third Reich and the Soviet Union had agreed how to divide the border states
between themselves. The pact surprised the world because of their mutual hostility and their opposed ideologies.
But Hitler had long wanted to conquer western Russia in order to exploit its untermensch Slavic population. So
the pact was simply for (mutual) short-term convenience, and the Nazis had no qualms about breaking it.
Operation Barbarossa was largely the brainchild of Hitler himself. His general staff advised against fighting a
war on two fronts. But Hitler considered himself a political and military genius, and indeed at this point in
the war he had achieved a whole series of lightning victories against what appeared to be insurmountable odds,
while the generals wanted to prove that they were needed at all. His brashness and willingness to take
risks, combined with the discipline of his troops and the Blitzkrieg tactics, had won him the Sudetenland and
Czechoslovakia with hardly a struggle, then Poland, Denmark and Norway with only slightly more trouble. Then
he achieved the rapid collapse of the French armies by running through Belgium and around the Maginot Line.
Hitler was overconfident due to his rapid success in Western Europe, as well as the Red Army's ineptitude in
the Winter War. He expected victory in a few months and did not prepare for a war lasting into the winter. Troops
lacked adequate clothing. He hoped a quick victory against the Red Army would encourage Britain to accept peace terms.
In preparation for the attack, Hitler moved 3.2 million men to the Soviet border, launched many aerial surveillance
missions over Soviet territory, and stockpiled vast amounts of material in the East. Yet the Soviets were still
taken by surprise. This has mostly to do with Stalin's unshakeable belief that the Third Reich was unlikely to
attack only two years after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
The ultimate strategy Hitler and his assistants in the German high command decided upon involved three separate
army groups assigned to capture specific regions and large cities of the Soviet Union once the invasion began.
Soviet preparations
Coming into the 1940s, the Soviet Union was by no means a weak country. Rapid Soviet industrialization in the
1930s had resulted in industrial output being second only to that of the United States, and equal to that of Nazi
Germany. Production of military items grew steadily, and in the pre-war years the economy became progressively
oriented toward military production.
In 1941 the Soviet armed forces outnumbered their German counterparts by a great margin. Although the actual
figures remain classified even today, estimates are that the Soviet Union had from 4.4 million to nearly 5 million
men in arms at the inception of Operation Barbarossa. It could field about 24,000 tanks against the German 3,350.
However, the Soviet numerical advantage was more than offset by the superior average quality of German planes
(and even tanks) along with the much superior training of German forces. The Soviet officer corps and high
command had also been decimated by Stalin's Great Purge (1935–1938), during which almost all experienced Red
Army officers and generals were executed or shipped to Siberia, replaced with officers deemed more "politically reliable."
As a result, although on paper the Red Army in 1941 seemed at least the equal of the German army, the reality
in the field was far different; incompetent officers, as well as partial lack of equipment, poor quality of
equipment, insufficient motorised logistical support, and poor training placed the Red Army at a severe
disadvantage when facing the Germans.
One area of exception to this rule was the T-34 tank, which was coming into service with the Red Army in 1941.
The T-34 was a revolutionary tank design, setting new standards for maneuverability, firepower, and armor protection.
It came as a rude surprise to the German army in 1941, and the T-34 remained arguably superior to any German tank all
the way until 1943. However, few T-34s were at the front in 1941, the crews of those that did exist had received little
training, and early versions of T-34s had regular engine and drivetrain breakdowns. Therefore the T-34 was not a
significant factor in the opening months of Operation Barbarossa.
Having fielded officers who were certain to tell Stalin only what he wanted to hear, together with having an
ill-founded confidence in the non-aggression pact, Stalin was led to believe that the position of the Soviet Union
in early 1941 was much stronger than it actually was. In the spring of 1941, Stalin's own intelligence services made
regular and repeated warnings of an impending German attack.
Stalin's belief in his officers and military strength was so strong that he and his general staff, although
acknowledging the possibility of an attack in general and making significant preparations, decided not to run the
risk of provoking Hitler. Consequently, the Soviet border troops were not put on alert , and they were simply not
ready when the German attack came.
Still, further back enormous Soviet forces were massed at the western border in case the Germans would attack
nevertheless. In 1938 the Red Army had adopted a standard linear defence tactic on a line with other
nations. Infantry divisions, inforced by an organic tank component, would dug in to form heavily fortified
zones. Then came the shock of the Fall of France. The French army, considered the second strongest in the world
(after the Red Army), was defeated in a mere six weeks.
Soviet analysis of events, based on incomplete information,
concluded that the collapse of the French was caused by a reliance on linear defence and a lack of armoured reserves.
The Soviets decided not to repeat these mistakes. Instead of digging in for linear defence, the infantry divisions
would henceforth be concentrated in large mobile formations. All tanks would also be concentrated, in 31 gigantic
Mechanised Corps, each larger than a German Panzer Army.
Should the Germans attack, their armoured spearheads would
be cut off and wiped out by the Mechanised Corps. These would then cooperate with the infantry armies to drive back
the German infantry, vulnerable in its approach march. The Soviet left wing, in the Ukraine, was to be enormously
reinforced to be able to execute a strategic envelopment: after destroying German Army Group South it would swing
north through Poland in the back of Army Groups Centre and North. Then the complete annihilation of the encircled
German army would be inevitable, followed by the triumphant liberation of Europe.
The attack of 22. June
German operation Barbarossa on the East front |
On 22. June 1941, the Axis Forces attacked. The operation encompassed a total troop strength of about four
million men, making it the biggest single land operation ever. The surprise was complete, stemming less
from the timing of the attack than from the sheer number of Axis troops who struck into Soviet territory
all at once. Arrayed against them were 4.5 million Red Army troops.
While being initially successful the Germans ultimately ran out of time — by the time they reached outskirts
of Moscow in early December, the Russian winter set in. It is often proposed that the fatal design flaw of the
operation was the postponement from the original date of 15. May. During the campaign, Hitler
ordered the main thrust that had been heading toward Moscow to be diverted southward in order to help the
southern army group capture Ukraine. This move delayed the assault on the Soviet capital, although it also
helped to secure Army Group Center's southern flank. By the time they turned their sights on Moscow, the
fierce resistance of the Red Army, assisted by the mud following the autumn rains and eventually the winter
snowfall, ground their advance to a halt.
In addition, resistance by the Soviets was much fiercer than German command had expected it to be.
Ever more Soviet conscripts were thrown into suicidal assaults against German positions. Thus, bloody fighting
at Smolensk, located on the road to Moscow, delayed the German offensive for several weeks. German logistics
also became a major problem, as supply lines became very long and vulnerable to Soviet partisan attacks in the
rear. The Soviets carried out a scorched earth policy on any land they were forced to abandon, in order to deny
the Germans the use of food, fuel, and buildings on occupied land.
The Germans continued to advance despite these setbacks, however, often destroying or surrounding whole armies
of Soviet troops and forcing them into surrender. The battle for Kiev was especially brutal. In mid October,
Army Group South seized control of Kiev, and took more than 650,000 Soviet prisoners.
Army Group North, which was to conquer the Baltic region and eventually Leningrad, advanced as far as to the
southern outskirts of Leningrad by August 1941. There fierce Soviet resistance stopped it. Since capturing the
city seemed too costly, German command decided to starve the city to death by a blockade, starting the Siege of
Leningrad. The city held out, however, despite several attempts by the Germans to break through its defenses,
unrelenting air and artillery attacks, and severe shortage of food and fuel, until the Germans were driven back
again from the city's approaches in early 1944.
Causes of initial Soviet defeats
The initial tactical errors of the Soviets in the first few weeks of the German offensive proved catastrophic.
Initially the Red Army was fooled by a complete overestimation of its own capabilties. The Mechanised Corps, far
from wiping out the German Panzer Divisions, were ambushed and destroyed themselves. Soviet tanks suffered from
an appalling breakdown rate. A lack of trucks ensured a logistical collapse. The decision not to dig in the
infantry divisions proved disastrous. Without tanks and lacking sufficient motorisation, they were incapable of
waging mobile manoeuvre warfare against the Germans.
Then Stalin issued orders to his troops not to retreat or surrender, resulting in a return to static linear positions
which the German tanks still easily breached, again quickly cutting supply lines and surrounding whole Soviet armies.
Only later did Stalin allow his troops to retreat to the rear wherever possible and regroup to execute a defence in
depth. More than 2.4 million Soviet troops had been taken prisoner by December 1941, when German and Russian forces
fought in the suburbs of Moscow.
Still the fact that the Soviet Union was able to defeat Germany, even after losing a large part of its population,
industrial potential and agricultural lands, proves that the Soviet Union was not weak and Soviet commanders were
sufficiently competent.
Outcome
The decisive climax of Operation Barbarossa came when Army Group Centre advanced within sight of the spires of the
Kremlin in late 1941. It was as close as they would ever get, for Stalin's troops defended Moscow ferociously in
the Battle of Moscow, and drove the Germans back into the frozen wastes of Russia as the winter advanced. Not
surprisingly, the bulk of the counter-offensive was directed at Army Group Center, which was closest to Moscow.
With no shelter, few supplies, little winter clothing, chronic food shortages, and nowhere to go, German troops
had no choice but to wait out the winter in the frozen wasteland. The Germans managed to avoid being routed by
Russian counterattacks but suffered heavy casualties from battle and from exposure — Operation Barbarossa had failed.
The war on the Eastern Front went on for four bloody years. The death toll included about four million Axis and
eight million Red Army battle deaths, and 20 million Soviet civilians who perished as a result of massacres, reprisal
killings, diseases, and starvation. The horrible losses in the Eastern Front proved to be a major cause of the
Cold War, as the war-ravaged Soviet Union kept tight control over much of Central and Eastern Europe to discourage
new potential invasions from the West.
Please have a look at some banknotes from the World War II.
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