Alfred Graf von Schlieffen
(1833-1913) |
The Schlieffen Plan, the German General Staff's overall strategic blueprint for victory on
the western front against France in the years up to 1914, takes its name from its author,
Alfred Graf von Schlieffen (1833 - 1913. In essence it envisaged a rapid German mobilisation,
disregard
of Luxembourg, Belgian and Dutch neutrality, and the overwhelming sweep of German armies through
Belgium southwards in the back of the French defences pivoting on weakly-held left-wing positions
in the province of Alsace-Lorraine.
Paris was not to be taken but to be by-passed in the east. The intent of the plan was not to conquer
cities or industry in order to weaken the French war efforts, but to capture most of the French
army and to force France to surrender. Schlieffen in fact viewed the double encirclement of the
entire French Army by the right wing coming from the North and West of France and the left wing
coming from the East as the ultimate objective of his plan, his inspiration being the encirclement
of the Roman Army by Hannibal's forces at the Battle of Cannae.
Following the speedy defeat of France, von Schlieffen imagined switching German concentrations to
the Eastern Front. His goal was to defeat France in the time it took for Russia to mobilize their
army, and turn back to the Eastern Front before Russia could react.
The Failure of the Schlieffen Plan
Schlieffen regularly updated details of his master plan as a labour of love even after his retirement
from the General Staff in 1905, but his successor, Helmuth von Moltke (the younger) weakened the
plan's execution in 1914 at the beginning of World War I,
avoiding invading the Netherlands
(although the German army marched a few kilometres through Dutch territory), weakening the
German right wing and maintaining forces in the threatened East Prussia. However, it should also
be mentioned that respecting Dutch neutrality saved 2 divisions from fighting with the Dutch
defenders.
Early in the war, Moltke worried that the German left wing was too weak to contain the French
Army in Alsace-Lorraine and transferred divisions from the right wing to the left one. In late
August 1914, Moltke transferred two entire Army corps to the eastern front from the right wing
right before the battle of Tannenberg, because he feared that the German Army would lose the battle
and be forced to retreat to the west of the Vistula, an overly pessimistic opinion since the
battle of Tannenberg was in fact probably the most devastating blow to the Russian Army during
World War I.
Furthermore, the two army Corps arrived only after the battle was over and the German
Army in the East was able to triumph over the Russian Army without them. Not only did they not
help the German Army in the East, but they could not be returned to France in time to take part
in the offensive on Paris in early September 1914.
Additional forces were transferred from the
right wing to the left wing to support Crown Prince Rupprecht's offensive in Lorraine, which
began in late August 1914. All these troop movements weakened the German right wing to the point
were it was no longer certain that it could achieve its objectives outlined in the Schlieffen Plan.
Furthermore, General Von Kluck, the commander of the Sixth Army, tried to reach Paris as early as
possible, which exhausted his men, and turned to the East right before reaching Paris. This exposed
his right flank to an attack by General Gallieni's men stationed in Paris and part of the French
Army in Lorraine. As could be expected, he was defeated by the French in the First Battle of the
Marne.
However, a modified form of Schlieffen's concept proved effective over the same terrain in the
defeat of France in 1940.
Please see some Banknotes from WW1
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